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been duly established. West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, supra; 81
A.B.A. REP. 490 (1956). The State Bar Constitution and By-Laws
recognize the right of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
to control the bench and bar. In light of the inherent power of the
judiciary, along with the duties of the prosecuting attorney, his constitutional name, and the above mentioned statutes, it appears that
West Virginia would follow the general rule that prosecuting attorneys
must be attorneys at law.
Ward Day Stone, Jr.

Conflict of Laws-Erosion of Lex Loci Delicti Theory
P, an automobile guest, brought this negligence action in New
York against defendant, host motorist's executrix, for injuries received in an Ontario, Canada accident. The lower court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that Ontario's guest statute barred recovery,
and the guest appealed. Held, reversed. New York, as place where
parties resided, guest-host relationship arose, and automobile trip
began and was to end, rather than Ontario, as place of accident, had
dominant contacts and superior claim for the application of its law
upon question whether guest was barred merely because she was a
guest. Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279
(1963).
The principal case presents the interesting problem of whether the
law of the place of the tort shall invariably govern the availability
of relief, or whether the applicable choice of law rule should also
reflect a consideration of other factors relevant to the purposes to be
served by the enforcement or denial of the remedy? The instant decision provides a major breakthrough in the judicial struggle to
abandon the strict place-of-the-wrong theory.
The traditional choice of law rule has been that the substantive
rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are determined by the law of the place of the tort. GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 92 (3rd ed. 1949); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §
378 (1934). This is the general rule prevailing throughout the various
jurisdictions of this country. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Glascock,
187 Ark. 343, 59 S.W.2d 602 (1933); Ryan v. Scanlon, 117 Conn.
428, 168 Atl. 17 (1933); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Barney, 262 Ky. 228,
90 S.W.2d 14 (1936). The rule owes its theoretical foundation to
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what has been termed the "vested rights doctrine." This theory
holds that when suit is brought upon a foreign tort, the forum, instead of creating a right in accordance with its own Law, enforces
a right created by the proper foreign law, which is the law of the
place where the wrong occurred. That place, it is assumed, has jurisdiction or power to create the right which, as a vested right or as
an obligation, follows the tort feasor and may be enforced wherever
the tort feasor may be sued. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194

U. S. 120 (1904);

STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS

182, 184 (2d ed.

1951). As is readily apparent, such a rule provides the distinct advantages of certainty, ease of application and predictability.
In the principal case, however, the New York court refused to
follow the traditional rule. The court reasoned that unjust and
anomalous results could readily ensue from inflexible adherence to a
theory that ignores the interest which jurisdictions other than that
where the tort occurred may have in the resolution of particular
issues. The court further noted that the established theory had been
strongly discredited in recent years with a judicial trend toward its
abondonment or modification. Richards v. United States, 369 U. S.
1 (1962); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172
N.E.2d 526 (1961). Similar judicial disposition is also reflected in
a variety of other decisions relating to workmen's compensation,
tortious occurrences arising out of a contract, issues affecting the
survival of a tort right of action and intrafamilial immunity from
tort. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 294 U. S. 532
(1935); Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960);
Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. App. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Coro., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958), respectively.
The New York court, in the instant case, following its earlier
decision in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra, vindicated and
extended that decision by embracing the "center of gravity" or "dominant contacts" doctrine as the appropriate approach for accomodating the competing interests in tort cases with multi-state contacts. The court said that justice, fairness, and the "best practical
result" may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of
the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with
the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155,
161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954). Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
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280 N.Y. 135, 141, 19 N.E.2d 992, 995 (1939). The court further
reasoned that New York, which garaged, licensed and undoubtedly
insured the automobile, had a greater and more direct interest than
Ontario, which was merely the fortuitous place of accident. Consequently, New York should be afforded paramount control for the
application of its law.
West Virginia has long followed the traditional rule. For example,
the right of substantive recovery for personal injuries is governed
by the law, both prospective and retroactive, of the sovereignty
where the accident took place. Stated another way, liability for a
tort depends upon the law of the place of the accident. See Goldstein
v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942); Grim v. Moore,
121 W. Va. 299, 3 S.E.2d 448 (1939); Clise v. Prunty, 108 W. Va.
635, 152 S.E. 201 (1930); Owen v. Appalachian Power Co., 78
W. Va. 596, 89 S.E. 262 (1916).
The West Virginia court encountered the problem presented by
the instant case in White v. Hall, 118 W. Va. 85, 188 S.E. 768
(1936). In that case P, an automobile guest, was injured while riding
through Indiana in D host's automobile. The parties apparently resided in West Virginia and were to return there after a brief trip to
Illinois. Indiana had a guest statute which prevented recovery by
a guest unless the accident was intentional on the part of the owner
or operator or caused by his reckless disregard of the rights of others.
IND. STAT. ANN. § 10142.1 (Bums Supp. 1929).
The West Virginia court held that as the accident causing the
injury occurred in Indiana, the right of recovery was controlled by
the automobile guest statute of that state. This decision would place
West Virginia in a position contrary to that of the principal case
and in line with the prevailing American view.
Admittedly, strict adherence to any mechanical formula of law
opens the door to certain judicial inconsistencies. The ease of
modern travel and communication has made it increasingly so.
But, given a less auspicious factual situation than that presented in
the principal case, it can well be argued that the New York rule
would not simplify the problem but would confound it. For example,
consider the difficulty in applying the above rule in an automobile
negligence action which involved several passengers from several
states traveling to several different destinations. Suppose that these
various states had passenger statutes which required the showing of
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gross negligence, or comparative negligence, or completely prohibited actions against the driver. What law should prevail? Clearly,
such phrases as "center of gravity," "weighing of contacts," and
"paramount control," seem inappropriate.
In conclusion then, it is submitted that the Liberal approach
adopted by the New York court does not provide a cure-all. Its
application should be restricted to situations closely analogous to
that of the instant case.
George Charles Hughes, III

Criminal Law-Extension of Felony Murder Rule
One of three robbers was killed by their intended victim. For
this death, the two surviving co-felons were charged with first
degree murder under Michigan's felony-murder rule. The trial
court quashed the charge and the state appealed. Held, affirmed.
The killing of one robber by the intended victim is not murder, but
rather justifiable homicide and does not render the surviving robbers
guilty of first degree murder under the Michigan statute. People v.
Austin, 120 N.W.2d 766 (Mich. 1963).
The principal case raises the problem of deciding where the line
should be drawn in applying the felony-murder rule. Those who
favor extending the doctrine feel that the felon should be held
responsible for all the consequences of his criminal undertaking,
regardless of who is killed or who actually did the killing. Those
who would restrict the application of the rule argue that it would
be an infringement upon legislative powers to extend the rule to
situations like the principal case because the legislatures intended
that the homicide must have been directly committed by the
defendant-felon or an accomplice in furtherance of the common purpose in order to invoke the felony-murder statute.
The case of Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d
204 (1955), presented the same facts as existed in the principal case.
The Pennsylvania court held the surviving robber could be convicted of first degree murder, thus expanding decisions made in
Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), and
Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947). In
the Moyer case an innocent party was killed during a battle between
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